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The three brief and separate discourses that
follow are intended only to vex the mind concerning
some of the critical issues that preexist any svs-
tematic understanding and application of penal
policy. It is, of course, a matter of record that a
spate of words has been written on the subject of
penal policy, and it is sometimes thought that these
conclude what is worthy of expression. As a matter
of conviction, however, it is the better view that
impartial study of the subject offers the prospect
of only a beginning in understanding. Analysis,
not synthesis, is the object of the present writing,
and no effort is made to catch all of the issues in a
single integration. Integration, when so many
problems are outstanding, and require persistent
inquiry, would be a breach of respect for the com-
plexity and importance of the whole subject
matter.
The present effort views penal policy from three
perspectives. The first is concerned with the char-
acter of various alternative penal concepts, and
with the consequences of conceptual cross-currents.
The second views the problems that beset a penal
policy, notably, the widely espoused policy of
deterrence, when it is confronted by the variegated
realities of personal and social dispositions and be-
havior. The third discourse exposes the difficulties
that face a decision-maker, notably a trial judge,
when he makes a conscientious attempt to apply
penal policy to an individual case, once and for
all and with a limited range of choice of sanction.
If the analysis succeeds in its proposal, there is
no basis for any present affirmative conclusions.
There is only the prospect for an aggregate of
studies, reflective and empirical, which will (1)
rigorously define and separately evaluate alterna-
tive concepts and operations of penal policy, and
(2) systematically compose the interaction to be
achieved between policies, and between policy
makers.
I. THE CONCEPTUAL TERRAIN OF PENAL POLICY
"The end of all penal laws is, that they
may not be applied."
Fichte, THE SCIENCE OF RItGwir, p. 345
Penal policy, through the years, attests to the
rationalizing skills of man. Nietzsche makes this
point, somewhat acidly, in a rhetorical question
sequence. "What tactics have our moral genealo-
gists employed up to the present in these cases?
... They find out some 'end' in the punishment,
for instance, revenge and deterrence, and then in
all their innocence set this end at the beginning,
as the causa fiendi of the punishment."'
At the present time we are concerned essentially
with four explanations, qua rationalizations, of
penal policy. Perhaps the most ubiquitous, and
the most grating, of these is the policy of retribu-
tion. Another policy, to which Bentham5 and
Beccaria3 devoted passionate energy, stresses the
instructional character of penalties and is aimed
at the general deterrence of crime. A third policy,
to use a term developed by Oppenheimer' stresses
the "disablement" of the offender so as to render
crime, at least theoretically, a physical impossi-
bility. The fourth policy focuses on the rehabili-
tation potentials of convicted offenders and empha-
sizes the importance of salvaging human re-
sources, whether for moral, practical or aesthetic
reasons.
'NIETZSCiE, THE GENEALOGY OF MORALS, in Col-
lected Works, V. 13, p. 89 (Levy ed. 1909-13).2 
BNTxHAM, PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND LEGISLA-
TION, particularly 170-203 (New ed. 1823).
3 BECCARIA, ESSAY ON CRIMES AND PUNISHMENTS
73 and passin (1801).
4
OPPENIHEIMER, THE RATIONALE OF PUNISHMENT
254 (1913).
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There are also other important rationalizations
that could be, or may be, the bases for penal policy.
For example, there is expiation, a theological
proposition for the atonement of sin. It still finds
an occasional modern contender, such as Alexan-
der, 5 who asserts that it is an important operation,
if not a justification, of penal policy. "Punish-
ment results [for the neurotic offender] in little
more than the fact that the criminal experiences a
sense of relief; it gives him a sense of having expi-
ated his sins and thus reduces his inhibitions."0
There is also the aesthetic view, expressed by
Leibniz as a "pre-established harmony"7 between
crime and punishment but, as Oppenheimer points
out, "the ideas of proportion, of harmony, of fitness,
as underlying the aesthetic views of punishment,
are nothing else than the idea of justice, if not of an
intellectual talion; in other words, purely moral
notions behind a transparent aesthetic veil." 8
There are also other policies, but what the recent
report of the British Royal Commission on Capital
Punishment sagely notes in relation to three penal
policies, may be extended to all. In referring to the
punishment purposes of retribution, deterrence
and reformation, the Commission said, "The
relative importance of these three principles has
been differently assessed at different periods and
by different authorities; and the philosophers and
penologists have emphasized one or another of
them, sometimes even to the exclusion of others."'"
THE POLICY OF RETRIBUTION
It was Sir James Stephen who made the per-
emptory statement that it is "highly desirable
that criminals should be hated, that the punish-
ments inflicted upon them should be so contrived
as to give expression to that hatred." "The execu-
tion of criminal justice... stands to one set of
passions [deliberate anger and righteous disappro-
bation] in the same relation in which marriage
stands to [sexual passion]."' 2 Stephen provides a
prototypical view for retribution as the most essen-
tial basis of penal policy. Try as we may, and we
5ALExANDER AND STAUB, THE CRIMINAL, THE
JUDGE AND THE PUBLIC (Rev. ed. 1956).
6 Id. at 57.
T
LEIBNIZ, THE MONADOLGY, IN LEIBNIZ, PInLO-
SOPHICAL WRITINGS 18-19 (Morris trans. 1934).
s Op. cit. supra. note 4 at 223.
9 REPORT OF THE ROYAL ComMIssIoN ON CAPITAL
PUNISHMENT, 1949-53 (1954).
1" Id. at 17.
11 STEPHEN, A HISTORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW,
V. 2, 82.
12Ibid.
have tried, we have been unable to divorce the
moral discomfort of this policy from the present
operation of penal law. We have become more
"squeamish" about the policy, as Darrow says 13
and we have denied its existence in our verbal
policy commitments but we have been unable to
expunge it from policy operation.
The explanation for the annoying persistence of
the attitude of vengeance in the operation of penal
policy, lies in the psychology and physiology of
human behavior. Reiwald, a psychoanalytically
trained lawyer, observed that, "Punishment would
seem to be, then, nothing more than a kind of
reflex action to attack... And if there is some-
thing here that requires justification, rationaliza-
tion or concealment, might this not be the very
fact which no criminal law will and may admit:
that, in the strongest degree, it rests upon instinct
and emotion and therefore upon elements which
have nothing to do with law and indeed appear to
exclude it.' 4 Weihofen, who has enriched the
literature with his studies of the relation of psy-
chiatry to law, has recently discoursed at length
on "the urge to punish."'- He notes that the mat-
ter of the punishment of criminals tends to evoke
substantial psychological reaction. "When a
reprehensible crime is committed, strong emotional
reactions take place in all of us."'" "The urge to
punish wrong doers is not always an impersonal
demand that the law keep its promises. Often it
is an outlet for our own antisocial aggressiveness
which we have more or less effectively but guiltily
repressed."' 7 He quotes Frym, who says: "It is a
weapon in our own struggle against trends and
drives which do not admit to consciousness. We
should be continuous, aware that over-assertion
of a prosecuting, punishing, attitude toward law
breakers reveals the intensity of our inner struggle
and the instability of our own emotional equi-
librium.""8
The theoretical forebears for these statements
of Reiwald and Weihofefi are readily identified in
the literature of psychology and physiology. The
theoretical nexus for both is the now classical work
of Cannon" on the emotions. To use Saul's terse
"3 DARROW, CRIME, ITs CAUSE ANID TREATMENT 19
(1922).
3
4 REIWALD, SOCITY AND ITS CRIMINALS 199 (1945).
1 WEiHOPEN, THE URGE TO PUNISH (1956).
"G Id. at 130.
'7 Id. at 138.
18 FRYM, "Past and Future of Criminal Rehabilita-
tion," 3 J. PUB. LAw 451, 460 (1955).
"9 CANNON, BODILY CHANGES IN PAIN, HUNGER,
FEAR AND RAGE (2d. ed. 1929).
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synopsis of Cannon's proven theory, "under any
threat or irritation every biologic organism reacts
with physiologic preparedness either to fight or to
run."20 Crime is an irritant to the socially trained
person. It is frustration. A principal consequence
of frustration, as Dollard et al. have demonstrated,
is aggression.2' Aggression, in a highly primitive
form, would be represented in the acts and atti-
tudes of vengeance.
The instinctual element which is served by emo-
tion can be identified in the theories of McDougall2
or Freud. McDougall posited a number of in-
stincts as the directional force for behavior, more
or less modified in form by social experience. One
of these was the "pugnacity instinct," which was
served by the "anger emotion. 2 4 Both Reiwald
and Weihofen, however, identify their notions of
instinct with Freudian thought. The most common
psychoanalytic formulation views the counter-
aggression against the criminal not so much as an
expression of instinct, as a defense against instinct,
compelled by the strong and continuing power of
the anti-social instinctual forces in the personality.
The counter-aggression is, in the phrase of Alex-
ander, "a defense reaction on the part of the Ego
against one's own instinctual drives; the Ego puts
itself at the service of the inner repressing forces,
in order to retain the state of equilibrium, which
must always exist between the repressed and the
repressing forces of the personality. The demand
that the lawbreaker be punished is thus a demon-
stration against one's own inner drives, a demon-
stration which tends to keep those drives amenable
to control: 'I forbid the lawbreaker what I forbid
myself.' ,25
But the aggressive emotion focused on the
criminal may also be instinctual, and it is to this
that Weihofen adverts.26 The "impulse to retalia-
tion" arises when, according to Alexander, "a pain-
ful and damaging circumstance arises from with-
out, [whereupon] man.., insists on injuring the
assailant."'2 And, as if instinct and countering
20 SAUL, BASES OF HUMAN BEHAVIOR 22 (1951).
21 DOLLARD el al., FRUSTRATION AND AGGRESSION
(1939).
2 McDOUGALL, INTRODUCTION TO SOCIAL PSYCHOL-
OGY (1908).
23 Perhaps the simplest presentation of the concept
of instinct in Freudian personality theory is to be found
in FREUD, NEW INTRODUCTORY LECTURES IN PSYCHO-
ANALYSIS 82-152 (Sprott trans. 1933).
24 McDOUGALL, op. cit. supra note 22 at 59.
z ALEXANDER AND STAUB, op. cit. supra note 5
at 215.
26 VEIHOFEN, op. cit. supra note 15 at 138, 139.
ALEXANDER AND STAUB, op. cit. supra note 5 at 218.
against instinct were not motive enough for ag-
gression, there is also the "identification with the
aggressor" noted by Anna Freud 8 Vindictiveness
and antagonism against the criminal give vicarious
expression to hostile impulses under cover of the
law. We are not so much against the aggression of
the criminal as we are in favor of our own.
In his lectures on the common law, Holmes re-
marked, "The first requirement of a sound body
of law is, that it should correspond with the actual
feelings and demands of the community, whether
right or wrong."2 9 Implicit is the recognition that
there must be some correspondence between the
"is" of reality and the "ought" of the law. How-
ever repugnant the wart of reality may be, it
cannot be wished away.
The political advice of Holmes, combined with
our best knowledge of the psychology and physi-
ology of human behavior, distinguishes aggression
toward the criminal as an important facet of penal
policy. By any name it is one of the important
structural elements of an encompassing theory of
penal policy, if the theory is to stand up under the
test of empirical validity.
THE POLICY OF DETERRENCE
While counter-aggression against the criminal is
a response to man's nature, the policy of deterrence
is a demand for social order. The first is essentially
a product of what Frank has called "inevitabil-
ism." 0 The second is based essentially on a founda-
tion of free will. The one savors of psychological
hedonism, and the other of social utilitarianism.
The policy of deterrence received its greatest
refinement from two penological reformers who
revolted at the barbarism of an unbridled and
capricious policy of retribution. For Bentham,3 it
was a cornerstone of moral law, and for Beccaria,12
it was the essence of humanism.
A number of inferences condition the operation
of a policy of deterrence and reflect on the em-
pirical validity of deterrence theory. A psychologi-
cal subsumption of the free will position is that,
to begin with, individuals have developed a
modicum of control over their behavior. They have
stabilized the function and relation of psychological
and physiological mechanisms so that they are
largely able to direct their actions. In this, there
2  A. FREuD, THE EGO AND THE MECHANISMS OF
DEFENSE, C. 9 (Baines trans. 1946).
29 HOLxES, THE COMMON LAw 41 (1881).
31
0 FRANK, FATE AND FREEDOM.
31 BENTHAM, op. cit. supra. note 2.
2 BECCARIA, op. cit. supra note 3.
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is confirmation in common observation from ex-
perience and in the authoritative knowledge of
psychology and physiology. In Freud, we find it
in the concepts and the data of ego development
and ego behavior. In physiology we find it in
Sherrington's classical demonstration of the inte-
gration of nervous system activity and in such
verified concepts as Cannon's "homeostasis" 5 the
tendency to establish stability and equilibrium in
physiological processes.
A further psychological subsumption is the
corollary of the principle of control and stability
just mentioned. Organisms must be free to register
impressions and their behavior, in the light of these
impressions, must be modifiable. This is implicitly
and explicitly established in the work of the
physiologists. It is further demonstrated in
processes of learning-the subject of meticulous
study by psychologists such as Hull and others3 6
There is, in the technique of deterrence, a fur-
ther subsumption that it is the experience of pain
or discomfort that generates learning. Punishment
for crime, communicated by example, serves to re-
inforce learned dispositions against and away from
criminal activity. In this there is reasonable sup-
port from psychologists who study learning,
though other techniques and effects might work
just as well or better.-
Deterrence has long been considered a nobler
penal policy than retribution. In the words of
Protagoras, "No one punishes the evil-doer under
the notion, or for the reason, that he has done
wrong,--only the unreasonable fury of a beast acts
in that manner. But he who desires to inflict
rational punishment does not retaliate for a past
wrong which cannot be undone; he has regard to
the future, and is desirous that the man who is
punished, and he who sees him punished, may be
deterred from doing wrong again. He punishes for
the sake of prevention." 3 It has also served, at
least in principle, as a binary compound for state
living and public order. In its narrowest concep-
"FREUD, op. cit. supra note 23 at 82-112.
31 SHERRINGTON, THE INTEGRATIVE ACTION oF THE
NERVOUS SYSTEM (New ed. 1947).
15 CANNON, THE WISDOM OF THE BODY 24 (Rev. ed.
1939).
as See, e.g., HULL, PRIN'CIPLES OF BEHAVIOR (1943)
and TOLMAN, PURPOSIVE BEHAVIOR IN ANIMALS AND
MEN (1932).
rSee the discussion of the effects of punishment in
various theories of learning, in HILGARD, THEORIES OF
LEARNING, passim (2d ed. 1956).
"8 PLATO, PROTAGORAS. Jowett trans. in GREAT
BOOKS OF TIE VESTERN WORLD, V. 1, p. 45 (Hutchins,
ed. 1952).
tion, it reaches, or is intended to reach, those most
disposed to commit certain crimes. In its broadest
sense, it influences the largest mass of citizenry,
by strengthening suppressive influences within the
individual that counteract unsocialized and anti-
social tendencies. It is only that segment of society
best known to the experience of psychiatry, in
whom mental and emotional disabilities seriously
impair learning ability, that a policy of deterrence
can afford no rational meaning.
THE POLICY OF DISABLEMENT
In its most primitive assumption, the policy of
disablement treats the offender as a bele froce. In
the view of Fichte, "the outlaw is considered
simply as a wild beast, which must be shot... the
death of the outlaw is not a means of punishment,
but merely of security."3 9 The logic is even more
distinct in the sharper delineation of the criminal
propensity that has characterized some historical
punishments. As Oppenheimer notes, in speaking
of the technique of mutilation that has charac-
terized some penal practices in the past, "a hand-
less thief is no longer light-fingered, and the
sanctity of the marriage-bed is not likely to be
violated by an adulterer once he is castrated."40
Disablement, or preventing the offender from
committing further crime, is accomplished today
primarily by the technique of physical isolation.
Society is secured from his depredations by,
literally and figuratively, a high wall of protection,
reduced in scope only as the individual animus
ferociens is considered to be reduced in danger.
Segregation is achieved not on an individual but
on a class basis, the classes of criminals being
separated from the classes of non-criminals. Im-
plicit in the class of criminals, but muted by a lack
of consideration, is a social tropism guided by an
independent set of psychological principles. Only
one psychological principle is evident. There must
be, even in the "criminal class" of society, a modi-
cum of individual self-control. Though not per-
fected to the degree of normality, it is nevertheless
sufficient to permit the preservation of the class
and the continued survival of the individual
human being.
Disablement, unlike the policies of retribution
and deterrence, construes the offender as both the
means and the object of the penal sanction. If he
is to survive at all, he will survive only on the con-
39 FICHTE, TIHE SCIENCE OF RIGITS 366 (Kroeger
trans. 1869).
'0 OPPENHEIMER, op. cit. supra note 4 at 256.
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dition that he, and not some others, will be pre-
vented from further crime. It is to control him,
and not to satisfy others, that action is taken
against him. Society, at least according to the
principle of the policy, is of course instrumentally
benefited.
THE POLICY OF REHABILITATION
A striking feature of the modem consideration
of crime is the amount of panegyric generated for
a policy of rehabilitation of the criminal. Among
the professions, psychiatry and sociology, most of
all, have elevated the policy almost to the plane
of a social ethic. There is, on the one hand, a
preachment of individual and social determinism,
acting as a bar to punishment based on a concept
of responsibility. On the other, there is the growing
conviction that man's deeds, including crime, can
be molded by persuasion. Psychological and social
surgery provide the life blood for a newer attitude
in the relationship between man and crime, with
man more the conqueror than ever before.
Rehabilitation is a social objective that capi-
talizes, most of all, on the resources of the indi-
vidual for adaptation. Its promise lies in the
circumstance that the individual has substantial
reservoirs of learning ability that require only
proper exploitation for a beneficial social result.
It has-been the predominant view of law that learn-
ing is the outcome of the attribution of effects to
behavior. It is, in the early psychological formula-
tion of Thorndike, the "law of effect"' that regu-
lates choice in behavior. Punishment, above all,
as a blend of moral and psychological persuasion,
is most likely to produce the effect of legal con-
formity.
The prevailing view, in both sociology and psy-
chiatry, is that learning or relearning is a more
complicated process. It is a combination of bio-
logical drives, interpersonal relationships and social
structure that must be conceived in mutual rela-
tionship and pursued through the span of life, if
the criminal disposition is to be visited with an
effect of any consequence. The expert analytic
tools of sociology and psychiatry, professions whose
job is the analysis of the individual and of society,
are thought to be requisite to the achievement of
rehabilitation.
It is the individual offender, and his group, not
the crime and its effect, that provides the proper
focus for rehabilitation. It is considered both
4' TnoimuDKE, ANIMAL INTELLIGENCE 244 (1911).
politic and proper that, if nothing else, the offender,
at least, should be restored to a serviceable social
function whenever possible. A tolerant society
turns its cheek, that it may better be served.
THE COAMINGLING OF POLICY
The essences of penal theories may be succinctly
stated. In retribution, punishment is society's
reflex action to crime. It is, in psychological terms,
instinctual or counter-instinctual. In philosophy,
it perhaps measures closest to Hegelian views,
which are well expressed in the following terse
phrases: "the wrong act [the crime] is a negation of
right, and the negation has to be negated by the
reaction of society in the punishment of the
offender.' a In deterrence, punishment is a learn-
ing instrument, utilized to influence the conduct
of persons other than the offender. In disablement,
physical isolation of the offender is used as the
instrument to insure the security of society. In re-
habilitation, the moral and social salvation of the
offender through a sensitive process of education
and manipulation is the objective.
The retributive view, carried to its logical
destiny, need not measure consequences. The
policy is, above all, a catharsis and any injury to
the offender or any extent may be justified. The
reflex is the slap that follows a sting, and it is not
governed by any philosophical subtleties or im-
mediate utilitarian considerations. Viewed, how-
ever, as a moral balance rather than a psycho-
logical pleasure, then retribution is bound by the
principle of lex talionis. The punishment does not
exceed the crime. It is a semblance of the latter
view, combined with the psychological motive,
that provides one dominating element in the
operation of penal policy.
The policy of deterrence, carried to its logical
ultimate, would appear to require no prior condi-
tion that a crime be committed. Not guilt but mere
suspicion is enough to qualify the defendant as a
sacrifice to public education.
II. SENTENCING THE OFFENDER: THE EFFECT
ON OTHERS
It is frequently said that one of the most impor-
tant aims of sentencing the offender is to influence
the behavior of others. Bentham urged that
"example is the most important of all."' ' And, for
41 BRADLEY, Punishment and Mora Responsibility,
7 MOD. L. REv. 205, 207 (1944).
12BENTHAM, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES
OF MORALS AND LEGisLATIOx, 170 (1879)
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Beccaria, ".the end of punishment, therefore, is no
other (to prevent the criminal from doing further
injury to society), and to prevent otiers from
committing the like offense."'
The thought has ripened into a consistent decla-
ration of policy. But its execution creates a fester
of uncertainty and perhaps of misgiving. As the
Royal Commission put it," ' in considering the
effects of the death penalty on the behavior of
others, "(deterrence) is an issue on which it is
extraordinarily difficult to find conclusive argu-
ments either way. Both sides are commonly argued
by wide generalizations confidently expressed with
little positive evidence to support them," and
"the general conclusion which we have reached is
that there is no clear evidence in any of the figures
we have examined that the abolition of capital
punishment has led to an increase in the homicide
rate, or that its reintroduction has led to a
fall.""
The source of the difficulty is easy to identify:
it is the complicated behavior of man. It is our
inability to predict with sufficient certainty the
behavior that will result upon the happening of an
event. We do not know, in the event of sentencing,
whether the future behavior of others is because
of, in spite of or unrelated to, the sentence that is
passed. We do not know, the reinforcement of the
general condition of morality. A sentence based on
a policy of deterrence, could bypass the defendant's
crime and search only for a colorable punishment
as an object lesson to others. It is as a Heath judge
is reputed to have declared in condemning a horse-
thief to the gallows, "You are sentenced to be
hanged, not because you stole the horse, but in
order to prevent others from stealing horses.""
But this is not the law, however it may have been
in Heath. Social utility stops short of the needs
of justice and there is, at least in the eyes of the
law, no punishment but for a crime, and no lesson
where there has been no transgression.
The ultimate in disablement is, as has been said,
that "the outlaw... must be shot."" However,
judaic-christian morality tempers such a judg-
ment and security is achieved, and hardly com-
promised, by lesser means. Disablement is roughly
'3 BECCARIA, AN ESSAY ON CRIUES AMD PUNISII-
mENTS 41-42 (5th ed., 1801).
49 ROYAL COMMISSION ON CAPITAL PUNISHMENT, 18
(1953).
45 Id. at 23.
16 From Du CANE, PUNISHMENT AND PREVENTION
or CRME 2 (1885).
'"See text at p. 429.
proportioned to the risk of further injury, gauged
primarily according to the magnitude of the de-
fendant's previous crime. It is mostly measured
in terms of lengths of physical isolation.
As a policy of deterrence, by itself, might be
punishment without crime, so rehabilitation, by
itself, might be crime without punishment. Punish-
ment may be an armament of sorts in the tech-
nique of rehabilitation but it is by no means an
object of the policy. Behavior free of moral conse-
quences, at least for a time, may even be deemed
essential for rehabilitation, acting as a means
rather than as an end. But society's tolerance and
the law's sufferance does not extend so far. How-
ever much psychological skills may facilitate moral
rehabilitation, the latter is not to be accomplished
by a moratorium on punishments. The individual
benefit, and the ultimate social benefaction, is
restricted by what is deemed the most essential
mortar of a continuing society: ever present moral
standards and social regulation.
Penal policies achieve compromise not only
because of the intemperate character of their ulti-
mate philosophical implications. The technical
operations of each policy may vitiate the full effects
of the other. For example, retribution, if exacted
through the death penalty, preempts a policy of
rehabilitation. And, for another, rehabilitation,
where it avoids punishment, nullifies any policy of
deterrence that is based upon punishment.
4
But penal policies can do more than disassemble
one another. They may be in such close communion
that their identities become indistinguishable.
Disablement, through death or through imprison-
ment, may be retribution. And retribution, if the
punishment is mete, can be deterrence. Policies
may also support or subserve one another. Dis-
ablement, of some sort, may be necessary if re-
habilitation is to be achieved. Retribution, for a
while, may serve the policy of deterrence.
Small wonder, when techniques can interchange
policy without detection, that true policy opera-
tion has become a hive of confusion. But the con-
fusion would appear to be partly the consequence
of a missing term in policy definition. Policy decla-
rations, if they are at all certain, generally reflect
the temper of the moment. If the provocation is
great and the misdeed is vicious, then the com-
munity will decree and the legislatures and the
48 WAELDER has noted a number of these policy
conflicts in his discerning article, Psychiatry and the
Problem of Criminal Responsibility, 101 U. PA. L.
Rev. 378, 387-89 (1952).
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courts will probably enact a policy of retribution,
though by another name. If the spite is a general
lack of response to legal intention then, as Hall
notes in the actions of some courts on liquor mat-
ters during prohibition, the policy action "con-
sciously... travel(s) the road of deterrence.
4 9
The policy choice, whether it has one or several
dimensions of character, whether distinguishable
or not, is less for the future than for the moment.
'There is missing any contemplation of a change
of condition that would allow policy to be con-
strued in sequences. While retribution may be the
first essential, and perhaps disablement as well, the
vigor of these policies may run their course. At
some point in experience, their purpose and value
may be diminished. Another policy may, in reason,
assume primacy and serve as a proper objective
in the light of changed circumstances.
Penal policy, in each instance in which it is
applied, may be construed as evolutionary process.
This, in fact, may be policy experience. A hard
crime generates a long prison sentence. Original
maximum security precautions may be replaced
by minimum security measures. Adaptation, per-
haps accompanied by some useful instruction, may
lead to parole. And parole may lead to reintegra-
tion with society and complete rehabilitation. The
process, when it operates at all, is crude, because
the conception of penal policy in terms of sequence
is not clear. A clear relationship between policy
objectives, in relation to various points in time and
experience, is not well perceived. Policy emphasis
and residuals of one time overlap into another.
Penal policy, as a system of policy conceptions
supporting and superseding one another in rea-
sonably precise alternation, is yet to be under-
stood.
It can only be concluded, for the moment, that
penal policy is the meeting ground of both similar
and contradictory values in society. There is a
selection among policies of free will and of "inevi-
tabilism," policies favoring individual growth and
social protection, psychological hedonism and social
utilitarianism, punishment and favor, change and
isolation. It is, in operation, a mosaic of social pres-
sures, surface declarations and unconscious pref-
erences, spawning a variety of rationalizations that
suggest but perhaps do not adequately describe
reality. Penal policy is, as Nietzsche said, a fig-
ment, one that perhaps does more to account for
'9 ItALL, Reduction of Crininal Sentences oni A ppeal:
"I." 37 COL. L. RFxV. 521, 546 (1937).
behavior than to condition it, for reasons that we
hope to explain. And we should emphasize, too,
that we are not sanguine in our expectations. Ex-
planation is not ipso facto, solution. It is only
the means of understanding on which, perhaps,
a solution can be based.
THE REGULARITY OF BEHAVIOR
Let us consider, first, the behavior of man in
exlenso. The better reasoning is that it is a product
of internal drives molded into shape by external
forces. It is the biology of man on which the social
environment beats a cacophony of sounds. Man's
overture is a system of habits, sometimes agreeable
and sometimes disagreeable, that identify his rela-
tionship to society. They exercise his abilities and
operate his drives, and mostly, they produce
regularity in his existence.
Ordinary psychological knowledge has cap-
tured something of the flavor and the character of
these habits. It has, in fact, enabled the categori-
zation of man in terms of patterns of behavior.
There are hostile persons and orderly persons, the
gregarious and the penurious, the loving and the
scheming. There are the exhibitionistic and the
sadistic, the demanding and the retiring, the crude
and the considerate, the friendly and the passion-
ate. There are the capable and the incapable, the
accomplished and the dull.
The characterization of behavior has led to the
implication of a disposition to behave, and this in
turn has led to predictions of how an individual
will behave. Patterns of law-abidingness provide a
judgment of a disposition for law-abidingness, and
the prediction of future law-abidingness is the
result of this disposition. It is on this rational
order of events that the law is based.
In consequence of these general propositions,
certain flaws follow. The degree of behavior regu-
larity is not always the same and, in this respect,
law-abidingness is no different from any other
habit. De Grazia, writing on his conundrum, the
psychiatrist, points out that "the superego
[roughly, the conscience] ... is by no means of
equal strength or severity in all individuals."14
Since patterns of internal control over behavior
vary among individuals, even among those valued
as "normal," and circumstances vary within us,
the disposition to law-abidingness is not always
50 DE GRAZIA, Crime Without Punishment: A Ps-
chiatric Conumdrutm, 52 COL. L. REv. 746, 757 (1952).
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the same. And, further, though disposition may be
sound, behavior may still be different.
It is perhaps in these circumstances, described
by De Grazia, that a policy of influencing others
through the effect of sentence achieves its greatest
prospective benefit. The punishment of another for
crime fortifies the personal process by which all of
us achieve a determination to obey the law and a
habit of law-abidingness. "Law," according to
West, is "an extension of self-control." 51 In the
language of instinct, but within the meaning of
most psychological theories of behavior, he says of
law that it is "an external support for a man's
social instinct against the anti-social activities of
his self-assertive instinct.5''
IMPRESSIONABILITY AND MODIFIABILITY:
PERSONAL CONDITIONS FOR THE
INFLUENCING OF BEHAVIOR
The general influences of the operation of law
presumably extend to the behavior of most of
society, though we would be reassured if we had
data to prove it. The influence, though, stops
short of certain social statistics, on recidivism,
and certain case histories, on psychiatrically devi-
ated offenders. From the case histories and inter-
pretations of psychiatry, certain other principles
of behavior, important in addition to regularity,
can be developed and applied to sentencing.
Henderson, in speaking of the psychopathic per-
sonality, refers to him as "blunted emotionally...
he shows a 'belle indifference'... For some in-
scrutable reason he fails to grow up, he remains
at the level of a primitive savage with a distinct
distaste for reasoning and an 'impermeability to
experience' which allows him to live, think, feel,
and act in a manner foreign to his more civilized
neighbors. '"" Reich, in speaking of the same kind
of personality, refers to an "instinct-ridden indi-
vidual." "Broadly speaking, they suffer from an
ineffective critical faculty, they have practically
no sense of conscience."-" Cleckley 55 calls the con-
dition a "convincing mask of sanity," a "mimicry
of human life." The psychopathic person is out of
contact with the emotional implications of experi-
ence and does not understand its full purpose.
Comparable to the psychopath's moral insensi-
51 WEST, CONSCIENCE AND SOCIETY 168 (1945).
-" lbid.
5 HENDERSON, PSYCHOPATHIC STATES 128-29 (1939).
1 REICH, DER TRIEBJIAFTE CIIARAKTER (1925).
•S LEE CLECKLEY, ThE MASK OF SANITY, c. 23 (2d
ed. 1950).
bility is the mental defective's intellectual obtu-
sion. In the words of Landis and Bolles, "They
show inferiorities in controlled attention, memory
and simple ideation, and in the ability to grasp
similarities, differences and other relationships.
Because of these deficiencies, their reasoning, judg-
ment, imagination, and ability to learn are poor."
56
They are largely insensitive to their social sur-
roundings because they do not have the intellectual
capacity for understanding.
The perverseness of psychotic disorder is dis-
tinguished by an even greater encroachment upon
personality. "The distinguishing mark of psychosis
is a serious loss of contact with reality."' White-
horn describes the psychotic patients as "those
who are so seriously disturbed in their personality
functions that, for the time being, they are socially
unreliable, that is, insufficiently responsive to the
needs and expectations and common sense of
others."... [They] in general have what might be
called a very high 'sales resistance.' They are notre-
ceptive to advice or persuasion." 9 White, in outlin-
ing the characteristics of various types of psychoses,
uses such phrases as "the pervasive effect of the de-
jected mood (in psychotic depression). Even quite
incidental impressions receive a distorted meaning
which fits them into the patient's depressed state
of mind. His sense of sin and worthlessness is so
dominating that he can no longer interpret experi-
ence in any other terms. 8 ... [of manic states]
disturbances of thought and loss of contact with
reality are incidental results of the [manic's] over-
activity and overconfidence. The patient is too
distractible to perceive the environment with
accuracy, too changeable to turn his flight of ideas
into consecutive thinking, too elated to take ac-
count of facts that run counter to his mood.61...
[of schizophrenic thinking] the patient has almost
entirely deserted the level of realistic thinking.
His thought processes are autistic, like dreams and
daydreams; more than that, they are full of con-
ceptions that seem to be infantile in nature.
62
The learned opinions regarding the various dis-
orders express a common thought. Reference is
5
6 LANDIS AND BOLLES, TEXTBOOK OF ABNORMAL
PSYCHOLOGY 274 (Rev. ed. 1950).
67 WIiTE, TInE ABNORMAL PERSONALITY 514 (2d ed.
1956).
58WuITEIIORN, Psychodynamic Approach to Ite
Stutdy of Psychoses, in ALEXANDER & Ross, eds., D1-
NAMIC PSYCHIATRY 265 (1952).
51 Id. at 255.
60 WHITE, op. ci. supra note 12, at 517.
61 Id. at 520.
2 Id. at 567.
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invariably made to a person who has lost, or has
never had, a necessary facility for social living-
impressionability. The moral mechanism may be
impoverished, the emotional response may be
dried out or the intellectual operation may be con-
fused. For whichever cause, or causes, social ex-
perience receives a distorted interpretation and
learning with its normal intendment does not take
place. What is meant to create fear does not result
in fear, and what is meant to be a lesson turns out
to be something different. Impressionability is a
sacrifice to defect and illness, with a consequent
loss in social participation. There can be no effec-
tive policy of influence upon others where the
personal processes of thought and emotion do not
cooperate to produce perceptive and responsive
individuals.
It is not only impressionability but also modifi-
ability that counts. Of course, one cannot change
by reason of a stirring impression, if the impression
does not register. But the psychiatric literature is
also rich with descriptions of persons whose moral,
emotional and intellectual capabilities are not
grossly impaired, yet their behavior is intractable.
Alexander,63 for example, describes "the neurotic
character," presumably of essentially normal
intellect and emotional sensibility, and in fact
overburdened with morality, yet whose social adap-
tation is controlled by inner conflict. "Their per-
sonality seems split in two; one acts impulsively
while the other reacts to this impulsive behavior
in a very moral, even overmoral fashion.... The
powerlessness of the conscious Ego in face of the
impulsive behavior of the neurotic character is a
common characteristic of this type of person-
ality." 64 Closely related is the neurotic personality
whose illness is recognized in such symtomatic
behavior as kleptomania, pyromania, etc. An
inner compulsion to act, against the dictates of
ordinary sense, is the dominant characteristic of
this behavior. Fenichel, borrowing from Reich's
concept of "impulsive character,""6 labels this be-
havior "impulse neurosis," noting that the im-
pulses "betray a characteristic irresistibility."
6
As in the "neurotic character" of Alexander's
description, so here, there is an endless struggle
between hostile self-assertive tendencies and the
mechanisms of inhibition within the personality.
0 ALEXANDER AND STAUB, THE CRIMINAL, ThE
JUDGE AND THE PUBLIC 93 (rev. ed. 1956).
H Id. at 97.
6- REICH, Op. cit. supra note 9.
6 6 
FENICHEL, ThE PSYCIIOANALYTIC THEORY OF
NEUROSis 367 (1945).
The external behavior of the individual and its
effects are of lesser consequence in the struggle.
One may prefer the interpretation that a lack of
ready modifiability, such as the impulsive neurotic
and the neurotic character demonstrate, is a mere
consequence of the failure of impressionability.
The practical consequences may be the same, but
the point should not be missed that persons who
do not deviate grossly from normality, who can
discriminate the social implications of behavior,
may nevertheless not be able to enlarge and sus-
tain their learning so as to affect their behavior.
Their compulsive tendencies require something
more than a policy of deterrence if natural conse-
quences are to be avoided and behavior is to be
modified.
SOME SOCIAL INFLUENCES: MORAL PERSUASION
AND LAW ENFORCEMENT
A substantial degree of regularity, and some im-
pressionability and modifiability are the personal
conditions which the process of sentencing requires if
itis to effectively feed back its influence on potential
and future offenders. But amenable personalities
are not enough. They must be supported in their
law-abiding efforts by a social environment con-
genial to the operation of law. In Ehrlich's trench-
ant analysis of law in relation to social activity,
he points out that "the legal norm ... is merely
one of the rules of conduct." 6- "Morality, religion,
ethical custom, decorum, tact, even etiquette and
fashion do not order the extra-legal relations only;
they also affect the legal sphere at every turn. Not
a single one of the jural associations could main-
tain its existence solely by means of legal norms;
all of them, at all times, require the aid of extra-
legal norms which increase or eke out their force."6
It is merely a truism that law and order are
generally highly valued in community life. Moral,
legal and a variety of institutional norms gen-
erally converge so as to give to the operation of
law the maximum social support. But the truth
of the statement only bides for exceptions, and
social experience offers a number of these.
Normally, community moral persuasion is an
important force in support of the law. However,
as Petrazycki"9 points out with great prolixity,
law and morality may be separate operations. It
67 EIIRLICH, FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF TIE
SOCIOLOGY OF LAW, 39 (Moll trans. 1936).68 Id. at 55-56.




is important for us to recognize that not all of
law Ls invested with an equally persuasive mo-
rality. "fax cheating, as Dession candidly terms
it,70 does not sustain the force of moral sanction
that is associated with rape. And unprovoked
murder, which generally bears the cross of per-
sonal immorality, brings a much quicker and
more potent social response than does speeding
or gambling. Where the force of morality is in-
distinct, the observance of law must turn to other
influences for support. De Grazia correctly ob-
serves that "although most people are morally
restrained from such lesser crimes, the restraint
is weak and can under many circumstances be
circumvented, if not directly overturned." 7' Into
this breach may fall a policy of coercing the be-
havior of the many by demonstratively punish-
ing some few. Moore and Callahan have shown
that official punishment of sufficient magnitude
will modify behavior in such matters as auto-
mobile parking, with a resultant increase in
obedience to the law.
7
.
The notation of Moore's and Callahan's parking
and traffic study brings into view a second im-
portant circumstance that influences the operation
of law, namely, the matter of law enforcement, as
a necessary adjunct of legal norms. The general
assumption is that patterns of social and lawful
behavior are encouraged by consistent and sub-
stantial law enforcement. Documented experience,
as well as common observation, demonstrate
that the process of law enforcement is uneven.
It may vary as to time, as to place, and as to
kinds of misbehavior. Andenaes, for example,
cites the effect of a failure of consistent law en-
forcement on the operation of a law aimed at the
regulation of Danish imports from Sweden.
73
Danes visiting Sweden were forbidden to take
Danish or Swedish money out of Denmark, and
they were forbidden to borrow money in Sweden.
With lax enforcement, at least of the law re-
lating to the borrowing of money, "great hordes,
some days up to several thousand, cross[ed] over
to Sweden and return[ed] laden down with goods.
The traders were so numerous that the customs
officials and police ... checked to see if the traders
70 l)EssioN, Juslice After Conrictlim, 25 CorNI. BAR.
J. 215, 225 (1951).
71 DE GRAZIA, op. cit. supra note 5 at 478.
7 MOORF AND CALLAHAN, LAW AND LEARNING
TnFoRY: A SToY iN L.GAL CONTROL 83-84 (1943).
7- ANDFNAFs, General I'revention-lhtsion or Reality,
43J. CRnM. L., CRIMINo!.. & POLIMc Se. 176,183 (1952)
had tobacco or other highly dutiable items, but
they did not bother to ask how they had got the
Swedish money.'"' The Danish state prosecutor,
whose report was the basis for Andenaes' ac-
count, commented, "although everyone knows
that the great majority of the numerous
travelers... are lawbreakers... nevertheless the
customs officials... and the police... do noth-
ing.1 :7 ,
The lack of enforcement, or enforceability, of
the legal norm, and only slight investment of- the
personal inner discipline of moral persuasion,
discourages law abiding behavior. As the Danish
prosecutor noted, "it taxes respect for law that
everyone and his brother can see and can draw the
lesson that one can with impunity allow oneself
a wide margin in observing the law."76
Thit.: ROLE OF THE INSTITUTIONAL NORm
In broadest terms, the effective operation, of
law and legal process depends upon social en-
couragement. It derives from the moral support
of the community and from the diligence of
operatives and guardians of the law. A third,
and perhaps the most vital, social conditioning
factor is the influence of the institutional norm.
The values and practices that insure recognition
and success in a particular line of endeavor, or in
a particular community group, virtually become
endowed with the power of command. When
institutions, taking for example commercial enter-
prise, commonly espouse or utilize illegal means
to best advantage, and disguise their actions so
as to avoid prosecution, the operation of law is
seriously compromised. Consider, for example,
monopolistic practices and advertising mis-
representations, or unfair labor practices and
shady financial manipulations. Group encourage-
ment and the institutional norm, officially or
unofficially, nourish these practices and bring
their influence to bear in favor of violation of the
law. The process is given a very adept technical
formulation by Sutherland in his important treatise
on white collar crime, "The hypothesis of differ-
ential association is that criminal behavior is
learned in association with those who define such
behavior favorably and in isolation from those who
define it unfavorably, and that a person in an
appropriate situation engages in such criminal






definitions exceeds the weight of the unfavorable
definitions." It may be added parenthetically
that the criminal act is most readily under-
taken which suffers least from the inhibitory
influences of personal morality and rigorous law
observance. But, if the stakes are sufficiently
high, even these may be overcome..
The malignant influence of institutional norms
and group practices is of course not limited to the
commercial sphere. Consider some juvenile as-
sociation as another example where violation of
the law may be treated as a condition for ac-
ceptance or success in the juvenile community.
CONTINUING SOCIAL PROCESSES V.
PRECIPITATE CONDITIONS
Social as well as personal malignancy may
discourage or, at the very least, hamper the
effective operation of the legal process. A lax or
contrary social discipline, as well as personal in-
sensitivity and incapability, may make a policy
of influencing others by such techniques as
exemplary sentencing, all but meaningless. Healthy
institutions may compensate for those which
operate ineffectively. Strong pressures toward
legal conformity in social or commercial practices
may compensate for a lack of moral definition.
A potent and strongly vested morality may ease
the problem of conformity to legal requirements.
Rigorous law enforcement may counteract a
weak social will or a moral gap. It is, however,
important to recognize that there may be times
and conditions when society does not value law
and order most of all, and it is in these circum-
stances that a jural sentence may not operate as
a discipline, at least not as a discipline on a larger
community than the offender.
But generally, our anticipation, though not our
certain knowledge, tells us that personal regularity,
with sensitivity and conformity to law, and social
cooperation, through responsive values and
practices, characterize the field of operations for
law. Within this field, the continuing behavior
structure of the individual and of the community,
constitute a policy of sentencing to influence
others a reasonable possibility. But continuing
personal and social processes do not account for
all of behavior. However favorable they may be
to the operation of the law, they still cannot insure
lawful behavior.
The events that condition criminal action may
r SUTHIERLAND, WHITE COLLAR CRIME 234 (1949).
be precipitate. They may engulf the individual,
or several of them, in a tremendous moment of
emotion that will not suffer containment. Impulse,
in the common sense of the term, may characterize
the resultant action. Alexander and Staub note
that the crime consequent to this sudden emotion
may be a product of the psychologically normal
person, with "criminality resulting from an affec-
tive state or a special situation." 8 Even the
psychoanalytic determinist will concede, as do
Alexander and Staub, that the psychological state
is "acute, accidental" and hence the crime may
not be foreseeable and perhaps not preventable.
Somewhat analogous in the behavior of in-
dividuals in crowds. Le Bon"9 was the first to
describe in detail the highly volatile and virtually
uncontrollable passion of an aroused crowd. The
consequence may be criminal activity by nor-
mally conforming and reasonably sensitive in-
dividuals who, "in their right mind," would not
commit such behavior.
Instinctive action based upon overpowering
emotion is probably not an appropriate object
of guidance. The influence of a sentence on prospec-
tive instinctual expression has probably not been
tested, but the most liberal estimate would
likely not support its usefulness.
CONCEPTIONS OF CRIMINALITY AND THE BREADTH
OF A DETERRENCE POLICY
The total consequence of our effort at under-
standing so far has been no more than to reduce
the potential area of operation for a policy of
influencing a larger number of persons through the
sentencing of offenders. We have endeavored to
reduce the scope of the problem involved in
translating a sentence upon one person into an
influence upon others, but we may have suc-
ceeded in eliminating the problem, and the policy,
altogether. We do not know, for sure, to what
extent crime is a product of unimpressionable and
largely unmodifiable individuals, or of crime-
breeding or crime-tolerating social conditions,
or of sudden fits of individual or group impulse.
Perhaps crime is substantially correlated with
one or another of these factors and will not be
much influenced by the intents and effects of the
sentencing process. But, even so, there is room for
a policy of generalized influence stemming from a
7s ALEXANDER AND STAUB, op. cit. supra note 18 at 82.
79 LE BON, THE CROWD (1896). Cf. STRECKER, BE-
YOND TIHE CLINICAL FRONTIERS (1940).
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legal process. There is West's proposition s to
consider, that "law [is] an extension of legal
control" and does us all some good. There is the
support the operation of law gives to situations
where there is a weak social will or a moral gap."
And, though problematic, there may even be a
remote influence of legal sanction upon the range
and quality of circumstances that will generate
volatile and misbehaving emotion. For instance,
anger may not mount so easily in the face of
insult or antagonism, if it is commonly established
that violence because of such frustration will
lead to serious punishment.
Further, until the proposition is thoroughly
refuted, it is reasonable to claim that some pro-
spective criminal behavior, at least, can be in-
fluenced by emphasis upon the effects some in-
dividuals suffer for crime. And, while it is true that
a lack of individual or social receptivity vitiates a
policy of deterrence, there are, of course, various
shades of unimpressionability, unmodifiability
and social discouragement. Some part of the de-
terrence message may get through to some in-
dividuals who are poor policy risks.
In sum, the range of influence for a policy of
deterrence may cover a wider swath of humanity
than narrow conceptual theories of criminal be-
havior propose. The conventional aim, to in-
fluence "those who are inclined to commit similar
crimes," may be construed to refer only to those
persons whose criminal dispositions have become
well established and already channelized. On the
other hand, it may refer to the broader conception,
notably articulated by Alexander and Staub,
that "criminality" is "a general human mani-
festation."12 "The human being enters the world
as a criminal, i.e., socially not adjusted... The
future normal individual succeeds in partly re-
pressing his genuine criminal instinctual drives"3
and, it might be added parenthetically, law may
occupy the interstices by continuously helping
him to develop and insulate the process of social
adaptation and by controlling some of the social
situations that breed crime.
SENTENCING: THE ROLES o AuTHoRITY
AND PUNISHMENT
For some, the influence is enough when the
judge sits on the bench and wields his gavel.
80 See text at p.
81 See text at p.
8 ALEXANDER AND STAUB, op. cit. supra note 18 at
8 Id. at 30.
The exercise of authority by the judge is, of
itself, comfort and security against the dangers of
external violence and protection against the
thrusts of internal aggressive drives. The merest
action of the judge-as-father is influence and
reassurance because, as Frank notes, "the demand
for fatherly authority does not die."" The attitude
is close to what Piaget has termed "unilateral
respect," "a maximum respect for rules together
with the most pronounced belief in their transcen-
dental origin." 5 The respect may be coupled with
fear, more properly with the fear and love of
authority, bound up with personal desire, that
provides the basis for identification and the sub-
subsequent development of conscience. As Hen-
drick describes the psychoanalytic theory of
conscience development, "the Super-ego [roughly,
conscience] is the composite of identifications
with the authoritative and prohibitive attitudes of
other personalities," 8 and, Hendrick suggests,
"The formation of the Super-ego by identificaton
is a lifelong process."15
For others, it is not the merest action of au-
thority but its consequence that operates with
greatest force and influence. The fact that crime
results in punishment, that there is suffering for
wrong-doing, strengthens the law-abiding tend-
ency or, conversely, retards the criminal dispo-
sition. The sentence of an offender becomes, in
the words of Hull, "secondary -reinforcement" 88
for a previously learned connection between
crime and punishment.
The mere exercise of authority, or the fact that
punishment is administered, or both, may be
sufficient to discourage and prevent criminal
expression. For many, only this degree of influence
is necessary where it is to be used at all. But, for
others, and for some seductive situations, the
calculations of the sentencing process must be
more precise and perhaps more stringent, if a
policy of general deterrence is to succeed. In the
language of learning theory, the success of a
policy of punishments in promoting the general
inhibition of crime may depend upon such factors
as "the number of reinforcements [frequency with
which punishment meets the crime] and the
intensity (amount and quality) of the reinforcing
84 FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND 16 (1931).85 PiAGET, THE MORAL JUDGMENT OF THE CHILD
88-89 (1st Amer. ed. 1948).
86HENDRICK, FACTS AND THEORIES OF PSYCHO-
ANALYSIS 163 (Rev. ed. 1939).
8Id. at 164.
88 HULL, PRINCIPLES OF BEHAVIOR, c. 7 (1943).
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agent [how much and what kind of punishment]," 8 9
etc. It may require something like the elementary
cybernetics, that Bentham prescribed for sen-
tencing,9 reduced to the finer measures of modern
learning theory. Balance between crime and
sentence may be the necessary condition for the
inhibition of criminal tendencies and the de-
velopment of personal and social stability. The
proper balance, properly conveyed, may offer the
finest prospect for deterrence.
II. PENAL POLICIES IN THE COURTS:
SOME CASE STUDIES
Declarations of penal policy have a notably
consistent character. The prevention of further
crime by the offender, deterrence of others from
similar crimes and the rehabilitation of the criminal
are the invariant objectives. Only the order of
preference may be changed to accord to cir-
cumstance or to a systematic set of biases.
It is essentially to be assumed that the legislature
declares penal policy in general, through a host
of statutory prescriptions regulating the penal-
correctional aspects of criminal behavior. It is
also to be assumed that the courts operate as an
adjunct in declaring policy. Within the frame-
work enunciated by the character of statutes,
courts select a choice of policy that is appropriate
to the individual case. They thereby declare
policy but, principally, they enforce the policies
which are declared by the legislature and which,
presumably, reflect community preferences.
Adumbrations on declared penal policies seem
endless. What are conspicuously absent are any
detailed accounts, surveys and investigations of
how the policies are supposed to work, under
what conditions, through what procedures and
with what effects. It is to these operational matters,
relating mostly to policy execution, that we ad-
dress ourselves.
The present paper is limited to an analysis of
the choice and application of penal policies in
the courts. Mostly, courts do not declare what
they propose as their sentencing policy in express
terms. This is implicit, and to be garnered from
fortuitous remarks about the crime, the criminal
and the sentence, and from the consequences of
the sentence. Interpretation of this sort is haz-
ardous, firstly because there may be a discrepancy
89 Id. at 135.
00 See BENTHAM, op. cit. supra note 1, c. 14, on the
"proportion between punishments and offenses."
between what the courts say, what they purport
to do, what they want to do, and what they
actually do and, secondly, because the partly
objective and partly subjective operations of
the courts may be misinterpreted by the observer.
It is proposed here to limit ourselves to an
analysis of those cases in which policy is expressly
declared and faithfully pursued through defined
operations. They are the uncommon cases, mostly
because courts never extend themselves so far in
passing sentence, and they are very few in num-
ber. In fact, the writer has come upon so few
cases that they cannot be considered a statistical
sample of court sentencing for crime. They never-
theless can be viewed as provocation for a more
searching analysis and consideration of the
operational facets of penal policies.
Among the courts, the burden of analysis and
the responsibility for determining sentence is at
the trial level. The trial court determines who
receives what sentence and, possibly, for what
reasons. The cases that follow are from the trial
courts.
In People v. Smith,91 the court was faced with a
choice of sentence between death and life im-
prisonment. The jury had recommended life
imprisonment for a defendant who was convicted
of first-degree murder while engaged in the
commission of a felony. The defendant had ap-
parently brutally killed a young girl in the pursuit
of sexual ambition. The court expressly stated
three objectives to be considered in the choice of
sentence: "(1) That others may be deterred from
similar crimes; (2) that one convicted should be
deterred from future crime; and (3) that an en-
deavor should be made to return the one con-
victed to society as a useful member." ' -
The last stated objective, implying rehabilita-
tion, was rejected as implausible in view of what
the court perceived as a general lack of sexual
restraint, presumably irremediable. Its judgment
was apparently based upon the single instance of
crime and without known consideration of pro-
vocative circumstances.
Pressing the matter of this "mental ailment."
the court also concluded that a sentence of death
would be inappropriate as a deterrent to others,
since it "would not deter others of similar types
of mind from the commission of similar crimes."
91 297 N. Y. Supp. 489; 163 Misc. 469 (Sup. Ct.,
1937).
9 Id. at 492.
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It is doubtful that the court meant to imply that a
sentence of life imprisonment would have this
deterrent effect. The deterrence of others like
rehabilitation, is conceived as an unworkable
and inappropriate policy objective in the present
case.
Deterrence of the offender, presumably by
rendering criminal activity virtually a physical
impossibility, does appear to the court as an
appropriate objective. However, either the death
penalty or life imprisonment are conceived to
satisfy this policy equally well.
The final choice of sentence rests upon none
of the honored policy objectives in criminal law.
Instead, the court seems occupied with the strain
of passing the sentence of death and searches its
conscience for a solution to the sentencing prob-
lem. Focusing on a collateral policy objective of
tempering punishment with compassion, the court
decides against the death penalty. It relies for its
decision upon evidence of the defendant's reduced
capacity for responsibility, by reason of his "mental
defect," and upon evidence, notwithstanding the
"mental defect," of an honorable and law-abiding
prior life.
The court's opinion offers a display of facile
psychiatric knowledge that quickly rules out
policies of rehabilitation and deterrence as a
basis for choice of sentence. Finding these in-
appropriate or unworkable as a basis for choice,
it turns to a collateral policy of tempering punish-
ment with conpassion as the means for decision.
Perhaps this was more or less the only necessary
policy consideration. The relevant statutes, by
narrowing the choice of penalty to death or life
imprisonment, already incorporate a policy of
deterring the offender through physical restraint,
perhaps the policy of deterring others of like
criminal disposition, and they negate any useful
policy of rehabilitation.
Cmnmonwealth v. Rittern is, in respect to the
narrow range of choice in sentencing, a similar case.
However, though the court reaches a comparable
result, its process of reasoning is different. In
the Ritter case, the trial court was again faced
with a choice of penalty between death and life
imprisonment for the offense of first degree murder.
The defendant, angered at apparent rejection
by his lover, contemplated her murder and then,
failing a reconciliation, killed her. Both the de-
fendant and his victim apparently had stable
91 13 Pa. Dist. & Co. Rep. 285 (Phila. Co., 1935).
marriage and family careers for many years prior
to their relationship with one another. The court
consecutively considered four policies as the basis
for sentencing: (1) rehabilitation of the offender,
(2) retribution upon the offender, (3) restraint,
so that the offender could not engage in further
crime, and (4) deterrence of others "from similarly
violating the law."
Rehabilitation was rejected as of little relevance,
since the court was limited to a choice of penalty
between death and life imprisonment. The practi-
cal choice between the two penalties in terms of
rehabilitation appeared to offer very little con-
sequence since, in either event, the offender
presumably would not again mix in society.
Retribution was rejected as inconsistent with
more modern, enlightened trends of penology,
though the court recognized the prevalence of
this policy in practice.
Restraint, or deterrence of the offender by
physical isolation, was accepted as an appro-
priate policy objective in sentencing the offen-
der. The court reasoned that the restraint of
death would be the most effective. However, it
tempered this logic with the proposition that
restraint through life imprisonment is adequate
enough to serve the purpose of policy if the
offender is not a "dangerous type." If he is not
homicidal, savage, brutal or calculating, then
presumably there is no uncommon hazard of
further depredations by the offender while in
prison. The court determined that the offender
was not the "dangerous type."
Deterrence of others was recognized as a most
essential policy of punishment. The court reasoned
that the death penalty was a deterrent to potential
murderers "where a murder is committed from
what might be called a mental, rather than an
emotional, impulse-in other words, where the
murder is deliberately planned from a sordid
motive or where the likelihood of its occurring is
callously ignored by those who commit some other
crime which may well give rise to it... Where,
however, a murder is committed under the impulse
of some frenzy or strong passion, or where it
results from a mind weakened by long brooding
over a social entanglement, or by alcoholism or
the like, such a person is not likely to be deterred
by the example of a death penalty imposed upon
those who committed similar offenses."' The
court decided that the offense was not the result
91 Id. at 292.
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of calm calculation, but was more nearly to be
characterized as emotional or impulsive.
The court concluded, from its analysis, that
there was no policy benefit in imposing the death
penalty. Considering further the background of
the defendant and the circumstances of the crime,
it decided upon a penalty of life imprisonment.
The court's decision, including its choice and
tests of policy, is worthy of analysis. Rehabilita-
tion was not a very practical possibility. It could
serve little social purpose inasmuch as the prospect
of future freedom for the offender was compara-
tively remote. The court was probably not in a
position to foresee the passage of a parole statute,
applicable to the offender, one year after sentence
was passed. Deterrence was the major policy
premise on which the court acted. It postulated
deterrence of the offender only in terms of physical
isolation, calling it restraint. In declaring the policy
as appropriate for consideration and choice, it
did not consider the possibility that the offender
might be deterred by his own mental processes,
perhaps influenced by the operation of the sen-
tence imposed upon him. Yet, in selecting life
imprisonment rather than death as the appropriate
choice in deterring the offender, the court did
implicitly base its decision upon the manner in
which mental processes operate, or fail to operate,
in the defendant. It drew upon a personality esti-
mate to decide if the offender could, as a rule,
manifest self-restraint. It concluded that he could
display that degree of self-restraint that would
make life in prison feasible without danger to
others. Ironically, but not inappropriately, a
modicum of self-restraint was deemed essential
to the effective imposition of external restraint.
In deciding upon a choice of penalty to in-
fluence the deterrence of others, the court used as
its measure characteristics of the crime com-
mitted by the offender. It asked whether the crime
is more nearly a product of impulse or of reason.
It concluded that crimes more nearly characterized
by the operation of impulse are not likely to be
prevented by the influences that fear and reason
bring to bear on behavior. Hence, those prone to
commit such crimes will not be influenced in their
criminal actions by the punishment one of their
number suffers for his crime. Notwithstanding its
finding of first-degree murder, with the necessary
characteristic of premeditation, the court de-
cided, for the purpose of sentencing, that the
crime was born essentially of impulse and emo-
tion. It concluded that the death penalty would
in this instance not serve a policy of deterring
others. By the same reasoning, of course, the
penalty of life imprisonment also ought to be
rejected. The deterrence of others, in the measure
of the court, cannot be achieved through the
imposition of sentence in the present case.
Of the selected policy choices, the court is
left with the deterrence of the offender through
physical restraint as the only feasible possibility,
but its ultimate choice of penalty is not posited
in these terms. Instead, in its summary para-
graph, the court changes the basis for decision
from a question of choice between policies to a
question of whether the death penalty is necessary
to serve any of these policies. Answering this
question in the negative and considering, further,
"the testimony in the present case, including the
history of the defendant and all the circumstances
[of the crime]," it decides upon the sentence of
life imprisonment.
As in the Smith case, so in Ritter, it is the
profound weight of bearing the responsibility
of the death penalty that seems most of all to
motivate the judge's sentencing decision. And,
as in the Smith case, though less expressly so,
compassionate justice, imbedded in consideration
of the background of the defendant and the cir-
cumstances of the crime, plays a role in the final
outcome. The mechanics of decision in Ritter are
both better and worse than those in the Smith case.
In both cases, rehabilitation appears as an im-
probable objective. Ritter is on sounder ground
in suggesting that this is so because of the physical
impediment of perpetual incarceration. The
Smith rationale that the defendant is an un-
remediable type suffers mostly from the highly
questionable character of the diagnostic assess-
ment. Smith, and not Ritter, considers and.
rejects a policy of retribution as inconsistent
with modern trends of penology. Both cases
reject as inapplicable the policy of deterring others
from similar crimes, and for essentially the same
reason. Both read the evidence so as to find
crimes grounded in impulse. Smith appears to be
considerably more meticulous in analyzing the
criminal act to find the impulsive process, while
Ritter, in what appears to be purely casual de-
duction, implies a personality type to go with the
act. Both appear to conclude that impulsive acts
cannot be deterred, and Ritter also seems to say
that impulsive acts are the work of impulsive
criminals, who cannot be deterred.
Smith and Ritter appear to agree that the
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criminals with whom they are dealing can and
are to be physically restrained from further
crime. Only Smith, however, offers any analytic
basis for the choice of sentence in terms of this
policy. Implicit in the analysis is the concept of
deterrence by self-restraint as well as, and as a
condition for, deterrence by external restraint.
Both courts are unable or unwilling to satisfy
their judgmental needs in the major and generally
articulated concepts of modem penology. Both
find some, and perhaps most, of the substance of
their decision in the auxiliary policy of tempered
judgment and compassion for the criminal, if
conscience will permit. In Ritter, the policy is
explicit, resting in legislative mandate, and is
based upon tests (more accurately, impressions)
of capacity for responsibility and prior social
stability. In Smith, the policy is more implicit,
as the court considers the "history of the de-
fendant" and the "circumstances" of the crime.
Commonwealth v. Levin95 is a case somewhat
similar to Ritter and, in fact, arose in the same
jurisdiction some nineteen years later (1949).
It appropriates much of the analytic framework
of the Ritter case in its solution. The court here
decides between a penalty of death and life im-
prisonment for a crime which it judges to be
first-degree murder. The seventeen year old de-
fendant had sexually attacked a younger youth
and then, fearing exposure, killed the youth.
The court, as in Ritter, finds the objective of
rehabilitation pointless where the minimum
sentence to be imposed is life imprisonment.
It rejects, probably as too remote, the considera-
tion that the offender might be paroled in the
future, or that he might receive a commutation
of sentence.
Retribution is rejected as an unworthy policy
alternative, though the court considers that
some compensatory punishment for crime is
necessary in order that the law may not be re-
sented for its indifference to human suffering.
Deterrence of the offender through physical
restraint is seen as an objective accomplished
equally by life imprisonment or death. The so-
phisticated discriminations made in the Ritter
case in regard to this policy are deemed un-
necessary.
On the matter of deterring others likely to
commit similar crimes, the court concludes,
without consideration of the conditions that make
93 66 Pa. Dist. & Co. Rep. 55 (Phila. Co., 1949).
it so, that either death or life imprisonment, would
serve this policy.
Having as yet no policy basis for distinguishing
between a penalty of death and one of life im-
prisonment, the court turns in essentially the
same direction that was taken by the Ritler and
Smith cases. It seeks to effect a just and perhaps
a compassionate decision. Following Ritter, it
seeks conditions to repudiate or, in this case,
to justify the use of the death penalty. The basis
for this decision is the degree of responsibility
manifest by the defendant, and the degree of
responsibility of which he appears to be capa-
ble. The test of responsibility manifest by the
defendant in his criminal act is the identical
test used by the court in Ritter to determine if
the deterrence of others would be a feasible
policy: impulsive v. planned crime. Finding in
favor of the defendant-that the crime was more
a matter of impulse-the court then considers
his capacity for responsibility. It agains finds in
favor of the defendant, by reason of his youth
and a degree of psychiatric abnormality char-
acterized by expert testimony as "constitutional
psychopathic inferior," or psychopathic personal-
ity. Finding mitigation for punishment and
reason for tempering sentencing in the reduced
responsibility and capacity for responsibility of
the defendant, .the court decides upon a sentence
of life imprisonment.
The process of decision in Levin is similar to
that in Ritter and Smith, and a pattern of sen-
tencing may form. Traditional policy alternatives
are largely inadequate for the use of the trial courts
when they must make a choice between death
and life imprisonment. Perhaps they are irrele-
vant to the function of the courts since, in setting
sentencing limits for high crimes, the legislature
has already largely expressed and applied the
policies of choice. But courts, at least occasionally,
do attempt to forge a sentence in terms of es-
tablished policy objectives. In the cases that have
been considered here, involving first -degree murder,
rehabilitation has been rejected as inappropriate.
The deterrence of others has proven a difficult
concept to work with for the type of crime-char-
acterized as impulsive-involved in the cases.
Deterrence of the offender, essentially through
physical restraint, has been honored as an ob-
jective, but it has not been the substantial basis
for discriminating between a choice of penalty.
Retribution was considered to be a discarded
policy, though the Levin court noted a need to
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adequately compensate private and, presumably,
public feelings of resentment for the harm done.
In the end, however, courts turned to their con-
science and relied almost exclusively upon a
sense of justice as the basis for decision. The policy
of tempered justice, perhaps with compassion for
the criminal, dominated all other policy choices.
The tests of justice and of compassion were
posited primarily in terms of the responsibility
of the defendant for his act, and in terms of his
capacity for responsibility. In addition, the crimi-
nal's prior record for social stability and propriety
may be considered.
The cases seem to be in agreement. Conventional
penal policy objectives do not incorporate all of
the policy alternatives that will be considered in
sentencing, and certainly not some of the most
important ones. There is a large gap between
policy declaration and policy execution. Trial
courts have a great deal of difficulty in making
sense and making use of penal policies. Such
generalizations are important, but they are tenta-
tive, since it is not known if the cases are repre-
sentative. It is not known what the courts do when
the legislatures give them a larger discretion in
the choice of policy, through a wider range of
sentence. The area of no-knowledge is vast and is
protected by the prerogative of the courts not to
explain what they are doing, and why.
Halls has analyzed some appellate court
opinions relating to sentencing from a small
number of jurisdictions. He does not regard these
opinions as a national cross-section, but only as a
sampling of primarily agrarian areas. The cases
were mostly from Arkansas, Idaho, Iowa, Ne-
braska and Oklahoma, and from parts of New
York and Pennsylvania. The years were from 1872
to 1935, though mostly in the 1920s and 30s.
Hall interpreted what he thought to be the
sentencing policies of the courts. He based his
judgment upon the factors the courts took into
account and the statements made in upholding
or in any way changing trial court sentences.
Hall began with the assumption that the courts
apply one of three penal theories: vengeance or
retribution, prevention of further crime by the
defendant "through education, reformation or
detention," and the deterrence of others. "Other
factors of course may come in, but the chief
conflict is between these three ends of criminal
96 HALL, Reduction of Crininal Sentences on Appeal:
1, 37 COL. L. Rv. 521 (1937).
law." 97 Starting from this set of premises, and
analyzing the cases, he concluded, first, that
crimes against the person are punished in such a
manner as will most nearly satisfy the emotional
reactions of the community to the crime. With
regard to first-degree murder, he concluded that
"factors bearing on the moral responsibility of the
defendant are almost the only matters considered
in murder cases... In mitigation the usual
matters considered are the presence of provocation
and mental abnormality."98 His other major con-
clusions were that crimes solely against property
and involving more than a slight amount are
punished in such manner as will, primarily, guard
against repetition by the defendant, crimes
against property involving personal injury are
punished upon an emotional basis, and that the
deterrent element tends to become more im-
portant in crimes not involving the person or
property. His summary conclusion is that "some
one of the three great purposes of punishment
appears to be uppermost in the mind of the court
in dealing with each particular type of crime." 99
Hall produced system and finiteness in the
reasoning of the courts about sentencing. One
wonders if, left to their own devices, courts do
reflect such disciplined skill and logic in the de-
termination of sentences. There is no ready
answer, and most court opinions do not provide a
reliable means for finding out. Our brief but in-
tensive study of cases suitable for analysis does,
at least, raise some doubt of a favorable answer.
There are, it seems to us, several critical prob-
lems that must be explored if penal policies are
to represent much more than noble chants in the
courts. It is necessary to know the relationship
of policy in the courts to policy in the legislature.
With reference to any particular kind or degree of
crime, how much and what kind of policy is
determined by the legislature and what then is
the range of policy choice of the courts? Is the
policy of the courts in first degree murder, for
example, to be limited to the exercise of a com-
passionate justice? And in second degree murder,
or grand larceny, what are its policy choices,
considered in relation to what policy determination
of the legislature?
Assuming that courts have or will have a de-
fined area of policy choice, within those limits
91 Id. at 528.
98 Id. at 533.
99 Id. at 552.
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how does it decide upon ultimate policy selection?
What must it know about policy operation? For
each alternative policy how far must it or should
it evaluate characteristics of the criminal, the
crime, the victim or the community? In the
Smith case, for example, the court defined a
"mental ailment," impulsivity. It then ascribed
to this ailment a broad range of antisocial be-
havior and negated any possibility of deter-
rability. Assuming that one could define within
limits the characteristics and behavior of an
impulsive personality, to what extent is the as-
sumption of non-deterrability correct? In the
Riler case, the court assumed a relationship
between the degree of internal restraint of which
an offender is capable and the amount of external
restraint necessary to disarm him. On what
knowledge can the court base such a judgment,
and how valuable and available is this kind of
information? In the Levitt case the court mentioned
the need for compensatory punishment in order
to prevent community frustration and resentment
over the choice of sentence. To what extent does a
compensatory or retaliatory need operate, upon
whom and for what length of time? In Levin, the
court appears to scale personal responsibility for
the purposes of sentencing. By what criteria and
in what way is responsibility to be scaled?
The courts' criteria in these and similar pressing
matters of policy operation reveal flashes of
insight adapted, sometimes frenetically, as in the
Smith case, to the needs of the situation. The
reasoning is ad hoc, and the information appears
to be scanty.
The problems of choosing and adapting penal
policies do not, of course, belong to the courts
alone. But if the courts, for one, do not know their
range of policy choice and the methods of- policy
operation it is futile to think of penal policies
in rational terms. It is at this point, and on this
proposition, that the coherence and success -of
sentencing policies in the courts must begin.
